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Everyday behaviour involves a trade-off between planned actions and reaction to environmental events.
Evidence from neurophysiology, neurology and functional brain imaging suggests different neural bases
for the control of different movement types. Here we develop a behavioural paradigm to test movement
dynamics for intentional versus reaction movements and provide evidence for a ‘reactive advantage’ in
movement execution, whereby the same action is executed faster in reaction to an opponent. We
placed pairs of participants in competition with each other to make a series of button presses. Within-
subject analysis of movement times revealed a 10 per cent benefit for reactive actions. This was
maintained when opponents performed dissimilar actions, and when participants competed against a
computer, suggesting that the effect is not related to facilitation produced by action observation.
Rather, faster ballistic movements may be a general property of reactive motor control, potentially
providing a useful means of promoting survival.
Keywords: movement control; action observation; interpersonal competition1. INTRODUCTION
The mythology of the American West is shaped by liquor
and Hollywood (Brown 1995). Inspired at least by the
latter, the Nobel laureate Niels Bohr considered why,
during a gunfight, the man who drew first was the one
to get shot. He suggested that the intentional act of draw-
ing and shooting is slower to execute than the reactive
action in response (Cline 1987), an idea grounded in
the everyday trade-off between stimulus-driven behaviour
and intentional, planned actions.
This distinction between different classes of action is
not merely semantic: evidence for differential neural
bases for intentional, as opposed to reactive, movements
is provided by neurophysiology (Kurata & Tanji 1985;
Romo & Schultz 1987; Mushiake et al. 1991; Maimon &
Assad 2006), neurology (Laplane et al. 1977; Halsband
et al. 1993; Cunnington et al. 1995; Sumner et al.
2007) and functional brain imaging (Deiber et al. 1999;
Jenkins et al. 2000; Cunnington et al. 2002). Further,
behavioural evidence points to a distinction between
different types of movement (Waszak et al. 2005), and
switching between these two modes of operation can
result in a cost (Obhi & Haggard 2004). However, here
we test whether there are benefits associated with reactive
movements, consistent with Bohr’s intuition and
the gunslingers legend.
To effect ‘laboratory gunfights’, we devised a relatively
simple task of button pressing that required a stereotyped,r for correspondence (a.e.welchman@bham.ac.uk).
ic supplementary material is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.
b.2009.2123 or via http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org.
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14 January 2010 1multi-segment movement. In particular, naive participants
made a speeded sequence of three button presses that
required a lateral movement of their hands (figure 1a).
The movement direction and sequence of button presses
was the same on every trial. Having become familiar with
this task, participants were paired with an opponent and
placed in competition (figure 1b). Opponents faced
each other with their own set of buttons before them and
held down the central button (button 1, ‘the home key’)
to start a trial. They were instructed that by executing
the movement and returning to their home key before
their opponent, they would score points from their
adversary.
To distinguish ‘initiated’ from ‘reactive’ movements,
we had to ensure that trials had no overt ‘go’ signal; other-
wise, all subsequent movements could putatively be
‘reactive’. Therefore, participants were forced to wait a
variable, non-signalled delay before initiating the move-
ment. If participants released the home key too early, a
tone sounded and the trial was aborted. The covert and
random nature of the start delay, and competition
between opponents, meant that each individual produced
some trials on which they initiated the movement
sequence (‘initiated’ movements) and other trials on
which they reacted to their opponent (‘reactive’
movements). Data analysis considered within-subject
differences in movement execution times. That is, we
compared the response of each individual under initiative
and reactive movement conditions, rather than consider-
ing the relative performance of different participants
and/or the outcome of interpersonal competitions. We
report results from three experiments. The first estab-
lishes the effect; the second tests whether fasterThis journal is q 2010 The Royal Society
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Figure 1. (a) An illustration of the button press sequence. Button 1 was referred to as the ‘home key’ and participants initiated a
trial by keeping this button depressed with their right hand. They then moved to the right to hit button 2, then all the way to the
left to hit button 3, before returning to button 1. Buttons were separated laterally by 35 cm (experiment 1) or 15 cm (exper-
iments 2, 3), meaning that arm movement was necessary. (b) An illustration of a single trial competition between two
participants. Players had their own set of three buttons. The movement sequence starts by one player lifting their hand off
button 1, and ends by pressing button 1 again having meanwhile pressed buttons 2 and 3. In this trial player 1 was the initiator
and player 2 the reactor: player 1’s button 1 is lifted up before player 2’s. Player 1 completes the movement sequence first but
player 2 executes the movement faster. Note that this difference in execution times could be spurious: player 2 might simply
make faster movements. Thus, we compared movement times from the same participant—contrasting trials when they were the
initiator with those in which they were the reactor. (c) Distributions of button press times for two representative participants.
Boxplots depict the median, interquartile range and the extreme values; outliers are shown as single points; notches show 95%
CI for the median. The blue boxplots show the distribution of reaction times on ‘reactive’ trials. The green, orange and red
boxplots show the times at which participants depressed buttons 2, 3 and 1, respectively. Separate series are used for reactive
and initiative trials. All times are relative to releasing button 1. As expected for time data, distributions are positively skewed
(Ratcliff 1993). The increasingly broad distributions for buttons 3 and 1 are expected as time is relative to button 1 being
released, so variation is compounded at each subsequent stage.
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opponent, and the third tests the importance of a social
context.2. MATERIAL AND METHODS
(a) Participants
Participants were able-bodied, naive individuals (aged 18–39)
recruited from subject pools in Tu¨bingen and Birmingham.
Ten participants (four males, six females) were used for
experiment 1, 10 participants for experiment 2 (six males,
four females), and 14 for experiment 3 (one male, 13 females).
Further, groups of eight (six males, two females) and 12
(seven males, five females) participants were used in additionalProc. R. Soc. Bexperiments. All gave written informed consent and local
ethics committees approved the experiments.
(b) Equipment
The equipment consisted of two sets of three buttons inter-
faced with a PC through a data acquisition card
(experiment 1) or the parallel port (experiments 2, 3).
Each participant had a set of buttons attached to the table
on which they sat. The buttons were capacitor-based
switches encased in a rigid plastic of 4.5 cm diameter
(Captronic Electronic GmbH), i.e. there were no moving
parts and the buttons did not physically change when
touched. Custom-built electronics converted the button
output to a standard 5 V pulse. Button presses were detected
Reaction beats intention A. E. Welchman et al. 3
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centre spacing of the buttons was 35 cm (experiment 1) or
15 cm (experiments 2, 3). Participants sat at either end of
a 140 cm long table. Only for experiment 3, a 20-inch
LCD located 120 cm from the participant was used for the
visual display of symbolic button presses. In particular, a
row of three squares on a black background was presented
(one for each button, spatially arranged to correspond to a
real opponent). The colour of these squares changed from
red to white to depict the periods during which the opponent
was pressing the button. The behaviour of the opponent was
thus marked in an abstract manner that reflected only the
state of the buttons (i.e. there was no movement and no
schematic illustration of the opponent).
(c) Procedure
Participants initially took part in a training session to familiar-
ize themselves with the task. They were instructed to start a
trial by resting their right-hand on the central button (the
‘home key’), then move to hit the button on their right, then
on their left, and then return to the central button and keep
it depressed (figure 1a). Participants were informed that a
variable delay was imposed on each trial (no details given),
so they had to wait for some time before starting their move-
ment. The random start delay was drawn from a normal
distribution (m ¼ 2500 ms; s ¼ 500 ms). Moving too early
caused a warning tone, indicating an early movement error.
If participants missed a button, or hit buttons out of sequence,
a different tone sounded. On the basis of either error type, the
trial was aborted and then repeated.
In competitive situations, participants sat facing another
human player, or a display depicting their opponent’s
button presses. Testing sessions lasted approximately 1 h,
yielding around 170 data points per condition per participant
for experiment 1, 100 for experiment 2 and 120 for exper-
iment 3. The relative number of initiated and reactive
movements within this total varied between participants
(i.e. as a dynamic competition, this depended on the behav-
iour of individuals). In most situations, participants
completed a side-to-side movement. However, experiment 2
also considered front–back movements. Here, the board on
which the buttons were mounted was rotated by 908 and
re-attached to the table, aligned to the participant’s midline.
(d) Data analysis
Response times and movement execution times were calcu-
lated using signals from the capacitive buttons. The
‘reaction time’ was defined as the time difference between
the first participant’s centre button switching to an off
(low) state, and their opponent’s centre button switching to
an off state (figure 1b). The ‘execution time’ for the first
movement phase was defined as the time between the
centre button being in a low (off) state and the right
button being in a high (on) state. Subsequent movement
phases were similarly calculated, with the total execution
time defined as the time between the centre button being
low (movement start) and high (movement end). Our use
of capacitive buttons meant that downward force was not
required—rather light touch was sufficient to keep buttons
in a high (on) state, thus movement onset was defined as
the moment at which the hand moved away from the buttons.
Data analysis considered the distribution of movement
execution times produced when participants moved before
(initiated movements) or after (reactive movements) theirProc. R. Soc. Bopponents (figure 1c). Following Luce (1986), we quantified
these distributions using the harmonic mean to provide a
robust statistic suitable for non-Gaussian data (in fact,
using the arithmetic mean or the median made little differ-
ence). As participants could independently elect to initiate
a given trial at very similar times, some ‘reactive’ movements
might have in fact been ‘initiated’. We therefore discarded
trials on which a participant’s reaction time was below
100 ms (6.8% trials), reasoning that anything faster would
be unlikely to result from a reaction (note that this 100 ms
exclusion criteria corresponds to the time difference between
the buttons being lifted, rather than any aspect of the
opponent’s behaviour that might signal their intention to
move). (We ensured that this 100 ms exclusion criterion
did not bias our findings by analysing our data without con-
straining the reaction time, and the results were unchanged.)
We used further criteria to deal with outliers in the movement
times (Ratcliff 1993). One possibility was that a ‘reactor’
would miss their opponent’s movement, responding with a
considerable delay and thus in a non-competitive manner.
To avoid this possibility, data were excluded if the reaction
time exceeded 500 ms (3.5% of trials). Finally, on some
trials a participant would complete the sequence by correct-
ing for a missed button, producing a long, uncompetitive
execution time. Therefore, trials on which the execution
time exceeded 1000 ms (experiment 1) or 800 ms (experi-
ments 2, 3) were excluded (0.5% of trials). (Note that the
larger movement amplitude required in experiment 1 pro-
duced longer execution times.) While error rates were
generally low, some participants produced an unacceptably
large number of errors, making their data unreliable. We
excluded one subject from experiment 2, and four subjects
from experiment 3 because of a high proportion of slow reac-
tion and slow execution errors (defined as more than 25%
errors in two or more conditions).3. RESULTS
(a) Experiment 1
To investigate whether there was an advantage for reactive
movements, we considered within-subject differences in
movement execution times for trials on which partici-
pants initiated the movement sequence compared with
trials on which they reacted following the movement of
their opponent (figure 1c). We found that execution
times were quicker by an average of 21 ms when partici-
pants reacted to their opponent’s movement (figure 2a;
t9 ¼ 4.406, p ¼ 0.002), an improvement of around 9 per
cent. This ‘reactive advantage’ was most pronounced for
the first movement of the three-button press sequence
(figure 2b,c), quickening responses by around 14 per
cent of the mean movement execution time. Moreover,
the advantage was maximal when participants moved
approximately 200 ms after the opponent (electronic sup-
plementary material). However, as the reactive advantage
in movement execution (mean ¼ 21 ms) was less than the
participant’s reaction time to the movement of their
opponent (mean ¼ 207 ms), reactors rarely beat initiators
(e.g. compare the difference between the red boxplots for
a participant with the extent of their reaction time (blue
boxplots) from figure 1c).
The proportion of failures to hit one of the buttons in
the sequence increased for reactive movements,
suggesting that increased speed is associated with reduced
800(a) (b) (c)30 20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
25
20
15
10
5
0
–5 –2
1st 2nd 3rd total
movement execution phase
1st 2nd 3rd total
movement execution phase
750
700
ex
ec
u
tio
n 
tim
e 
(m
s)
re
ac
tiv
e 
ad
va
n
ta
ge
 (m
s)
re
ac
tiv
e 
ad
va
n
ta
ge
 (%
)
650
600
550
500
initiate react
450
Figure 2. (a) Average movement execution times for each individual participant. Data show the harmonic mean execution time.
Points connected by lines indicate the data from a single individual. Our data analysis considered the difference between these
matched-pair responses. (b) The ‘reactive advantage’ (¼initiated movement execution time2reactive movement execution
time) for the three component phases of the movement sequence (1st: lift up from button 1, press down button 2; 2nd: lift
up button 2, press down button 3; 3rd: lift up button 3, press down button 1), and for the total execution time (lifting up
button 1 to pressing it down again having pressed button 2 and then 3). Data illustrate the between-subjects mean response.
Error bars show s.e.m. (c) The reactive advantage expressed as a percentage change in the mean execution time. Data illustrate
the between-subjects mean response with error bars showing s.e.m.
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not constitute a trivial explanation for our findings, as
participants did not know a priori whether a reactive or
intentional movement would be made. Had the roles of
initiator and reactor been predetermined at the start of
a trial, data interpretation would be complicated. In par-
ticular, if participants knew that they would react on a
given trial, they could consciously elect to maximize
their chances of winning the duel by producing faster
and less accurate movements to compensate for the
time cost of reacting after their opponent. However, the
dynamic nature of the competition meant that this was
not possible: both participants prepared to initiate the
movement sequence. Thus, like a quickening of execution
times, a change in error rates suggests a dynamic compu-
tation of movement influenced by the type of movement
being produced. High-speed, low-accuracy movements
may constitute a characteristic of the neural systems
responsible for controlling reactive movements.
A potentially trivial difference between movements
executed under reactive and intentional conditions is that,
when making a reactive movement, participants had been
waiting longer to move. Under some circumstances
preparation time and movement speed are related
(Rosenbaum et al. 1987; Bullock & Grossberg 1988),
potentially suggesting a lurking variable between our two
movement classes. Our use of the covert random start
delay made this suggestion rather unlikely (the time from
the trial starting to the initiating participant’s movement
had a between-trial standard deviation of 775 ms in contrast
to typical reaction times of 200 ms). However, we tested
this idea by performing regressions of movement execution
time on the initiation time on a per subject basis, finding
no evidence for the relationship between preparation and
execution times under our experimental paradigm.
An additional concern might relate to the warning tone
that indicated participants had moved before the end of the
covert delay period. In particular, the tone might effectively
act as a ‘penalty’ that could change the movement strategyProc. R. Soc. Bso that participants were cautious, and thus slower, when
initiating the movement sequence. To test this idea, we
ran a control experiment on eight participants in which
the no intertrial delay was imposed. We found clear
evidence for a reactive advantage (t7 ¼ 8.426, p, 0.001)
when there was no warning tone, ruling out this concern
and suggesting that any penalizing effect of the warning
tone was not responsible for faster reactive movements.
These data were also useful in allowing us to test for
evidence of a speed-accuracy trade-off under our paradigm
(we could not do this for the main experimental data as
button press times were not recorded for error trials). In
particular, we considered the duration of the first move-
ment in the sequence of trials in which an error was
subsequently made (e.g. the participant missed button
3 or 1 during subsequent movements). We compared the
duration of these movements with those measured on
successful (non-error) trials, to test whether errors were
associated with faster movements. We found no evidence
for a difference between error and non-error movement
times for either reactive (p ¼ 0.27) or intentional
(p ¼ 0.80) movement sequences.
Finally, our task requiring a movement sequence of
three distinct segments might be regarded as overly com-
plex, with the necessity of reversing the direction of travel
leading to uncertainty in hand position after the initial
movement has been made. In an additional control experi-
ment we asked participants to make a simple, single
segment movement (from button 3 to button 2) under
competition. Consistent with our previous findings,
we observed clear evidence for a reactive advantage (t7 ¼
3.852, p ¼ 0.006) for this simple ballistic movement.(b) Experiment 2
To gain further insight into the reactive advantage, we
asked whether the effect might accrue from having the
opponent’s movement as a model for one’s own actions.
In particular, ventral premotor cortex is known to be
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or observes the same movement performed by another
actor (Gallese et al. 1996; Iacoboni et al. 2005), poten-
tially priming movement production circuits and
facilitating the participant’s own actions. Behaviourally,
movement production can be influenced by viewing an
action that is either incongruent with one’s own (Brass
et al. 2000) or a transformed version of what one has to
perform (Craighero et al. 2002).
To investigate the possibility that the opponent’s move-
ment facilitates movement production, we tested whether
the direction in which participants moved influenced the
advantage for reactive movements. In particular, partici-
pants performed the three-button press sequence when
the buttons were configured for side-to-side or front–
back movements (figure 3a). Thus, a player could see
their opponent making a comparable movement that
could act as a model for their own movement (e.g. both
players make a front–back movement), or movement
orthogonal to their own action that would be of less use
in priming action preparation (e.g. one player moves
front–back while the other moves side-to-side). Consist-
ent with our previous experiments, we observed a
significant decrease in execution times for reactive move-
ments (F1,8 ¼ 11.484, p ¼ 0.01). However, there was no
significant effect of viewing a different movement from
one’s own (F1,8 ¼ 3.273, p ¼ 0.108) or any significant
interactions (figure 3b). Thus, the reactive advantage
does not appear to be modulated by viewing the opponent
making similar or dissimilar movements.
(c) Experiment 3
In our final experiment, we tested whether the social con-
text within which the participants found themselves might
be responsible for their facilitated reactive movements.Proc. R. Soc. BPrevious work suggests differential performance when
humans believe they are interacting with another human
compared with a non-human agent such as a computer,
based on the notion that the mirror neuron system acts to
determine the intentions of others (Kilner et al. 2003;
Stanley et al. 2007; Gowen et al. 2008). To examine the
role that might be played by cortical systems responsible
for encoding the intentions of others, we contrasted
performance when participants competed against another
human (‘Person’ condition) or a computer on whose
display movements were presented symbolically. In
computer opponent conditions, participants were informed
either (i) that they were competing against a computer
(‘computer’ condition), or (ii) that they were competing
against another human located in a different testing room,
interfaced through the computer (‘virtual’ condition). In
actuality, the distribution of movement onset and move-
ment execution times produced by the computer was
determined from data previously recorded from the partici-
pant, meaning that they were playing against a historical
version of themselves, and thus involved in a demanding
competition. Debriefing participants at the end of the
session revealed this manipulation to have been successful,
with only one participant expressing doubts about the
authenticity of their computer-interfaced human opponent.
Consistent with the previous experiments, faster move-
ments were observed under reactive conditions (F1,9 ¼
26.689, p ¼ 0.001). However, the type of opponent
faced by participants (human, computer, virtual
human) neither had significant influence on execution
times (F2,18 ¼ 2.967, p ¼ 0.077) nor was the interaction
between the reactive advantage and the type of opponent
significant (F2,18 ¼ 1.650, p ¼ 0.220). The statistical
analysis on the type of opponent might suggest a marginal
effect. Nevertheless, inspecting the data (figure 4) does
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error bars showing s.e.m. Data from the three different
movement conditions are shown: human opponent, virtual
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hypothesis that the anthropomorphic nature of the
opponent modulates the effect. In particular, if this
hypothesis underlies the effect, we would expect the reac-
tive advantage to be lowest for conditions in which the
player believed they were competing with a computer.
Rather, the mean reactive advantage is lowest when par-
ticipants believed they were competing against another
human interfaced through the computer.
Despite this null result, the findings from this experi-
ment are useful in addressing concerns that might arise
from the paradigm we have developed. In particular,
under conditions in which participants compete against
a computer, there is no visual motion and no auditory
cues from the opponent, nor any cues of movement prep-
aration. A previous report suggests that movements are
faster when participants are able to see motion (Smeets &
Brenner 1995), suggesting an alternative interpretation
for a benefit of viewing the opponent. However, this
cannot explain our findings as the reactive advantage per-
sists when there is no motion in the display (just three
simple illuminated squares). Moreover, auditory cues
from the human opponent hitting their buttons could
increase arousal, or provide a movement-timing signal.
However, such cues are not available when competing
against a computer, as there was no physical movement
or button pressing. Nevertheless, our findings were
unchanged. Finally, in the context of bimanual reaching,
it is known that participants slow down the easier of two
movements when reaching for two different targets, such
that both movements end simultaneously (Kelso et al.
1979). Similar effects of movement coordination have
been reported for social (two-person) movements
(Georgiou et al. 2007). It could be argued that inten-
tional movements are deliberately slowed to ensure
synchronous termination with an opponent’s reactive
movement. The competition between participants and
the considerable delay imposed by reaction make this
suggestion unlikely. Moreover, the sparse display in com-
puter-opponent conditions effectively rules out this
possibility.Proc. R. Soc. B4. GENERAL DISCUSSION
Here we consider the production of the same movement
sequence under conditions in which participants initiate
the movement or react to an opponent. We demonstrate
that reactive movements are associated with faster
execution times, and that this quickening of movement
does not appear to relate to having another human as a
model for one’s own action. We suggest different cortical
processing routes for the control reactive versus inten-
tional movements, and argue that faster movement
dynamics may constitute a basic property of reactive
movement production.
The suggestion of a distinction between reactive versus
intentional movements is consistent with a range of pre-
vious studies that report changes in the balance of the
involvement of a number of cortical and subcortical
areas during the production of different classes of action
(Laplane et al. 1977; Kurata & Tanji 1985; Romo &
Schultz 1987; Mushiake et al. 1991; Halsband et al.
1993; Cunnington et al. 1995, 2002; Deiber et al. 1999;
Jenkins et al. 2000; Maimon & Assad 2006; Sumner
et al. 2007). Previous behavioural work also supports
this distinction. For instance, countermanding the pro-
duction of an intended movement to react to an
external trigger can have a cost (Obhi & Haggard
2004), suggesting a delay imposed by switching between
different modes of movement triggering (Obhi et al.
2009b). Under our paradigm, participants could be pro-
voked to move sooner than they intended by seeing
their opponent’s actions. Based on Obhi and colleagues’
findings, the initiation of such reactive movements may
be slower than the initiation of internally generated move-
ments. (This suggestion is, of course, untestable as we
have no access to the timing of participant’s movement
triggering decisions.) Here, we assess a different aspect
of movement production, demonstrating that reactive
movements can be advantageous in producing faster
execution times (albeit with increased error rates).
It is interesting to speculate about the neural circuits
that might be involved in the production of the movements
we have studied. One candidate region of importance is the
pre-supplementary motor area (SMA) region of the medial
frontal cortex that is implicated in the control of intentional
actions. Moreover, it is thought to play a key role in
switching between different tasks (Rushworth et al. 2002)
and selecting an intentional action over a reactive one
(Isoda & Hikosaka 2007). It is possible that the pre-
SMA functions to remove the inhibition of potential
actions—a function carried out by the SMA (Sumner
et al. 2007)—thereby giving rise to the production of the
intentional movement sequence. The production of reac-
tive movements may involve an alternative route that
disinhibits the planned movement sequence via the parietal
cortex (Cunnington et al. 2006). Our observation that the
reactive advantage is focused on the initial, ballistic phase
of movement is suggestive of an effect limited to movement
onset rather than being general to the production of a
sequence of arm movements. This suggests different
types of disinhibition for reactive and intentional move-
ments. In particular, disinhibition designed to prevent
early movement (Sinclair & Hammond 2009; see Obhi
et al. 2009a for an excellent discussion) may be faster via
the parietal route, resulting in increased acceleration and
reduced movement execution times.
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 on July 20, 2010rspb.royalsocietypublishing.orgDownloaded from Faster movement speed for reactive movements has a
parallel to known deficits in Parkinson’s disease. In par-
ticular, Parkinson’s patients are especially compromised
in speed when making intentional, rather than reactive,
reaching arm movements (Majsak et al. 1998). Differ-
ences between reactive and intentional movement
systems may thus become more apparent in Parkinson’s
as the basal ganglia makes a greater contribution to inten-
tional actions (Roland et al. 1982; Jones 1987). Testing
Parkinson’s patients with our paradigm would be of inter-
est as concerns about high-level speed-accuracy decisions,
or strategies for different experimental (i.e. self-paced
versus stimulus-driven) conditions could be ruled out.
We interpret our results as reflecting the operation of
different processing routes for intentional versus reactive
movements; however, might the results rather reflect a
deliberate strategy by participants, and thus not imply
different neural architectures? In particular, perhaps
participants deliberately change their movements according
to whether a reactive or an intentional movement is
required, optimizing their actions by speeding up on reac-
tive trials when there is less chance of ‘winning’ the duel,
and slowing down on intentional trials to minimize
energetic cost. This would be possible had participants
known ahead of time whether an intentional or a reactive
movement was required. However, under our paradigm,
the dynamic nature of the competition meant that
participants have little opportunity to change their move-
ments deliberately, as on any given trial they might be the
initiator or the reactor, and reaction times were low
(ca 200 ms).
It could also be argued that individuals learn about
their opponent’s behaviour across trials, thereby develop-
ing a strategy based on the probability of making an
intentional or reactive movement on a particular trial.
We believe this is unlikely as there was no feedback at
the end of each trial and participants were thus very
frequently unaware of who had won the duel (detecting
the small temporal offsets between one’s own actions
and that of the opponent in the context of a rapid
competition was not easy). Moreover, under some cir-
cumstances (experiment 3), participants were effectively
playing against themselves, making it difficult to argue
that participants exploited differences between their own
behaviour and that of their opponent to maximize their
chance of winning the duel. However, we tested whether
there was a systematic relationship between the prob-
ability of being a ‘reactor’ and the reactive advantage.
(Data were pooled across experiments to maximize stat-
istical power, and the reactive advantage was expressed
as a percentage to minimize the influence of between-
subject differences in movement times.) We found no
evidence of a relationship between the probability of
reacting and the increased speed of reactive movements
(r ¼ 0.11, F1,39, 1, p ¼ 0.485).
As a general survival strategy, the evolution of a move-
ment system capable of producing quick (and possibly
dirtier) movements that support faster responses to the
environment seems reasonable. However, within the con-
text of a gunfight, a strategy based purely on reaction
seems unlikely to increase evolutionary fitness as the
advantage produced by reacting is far outweighed by the
time taken to react to the opponent. Anecdotal reports
suggest that Bohr tested his original idea with colleagueProc. R. Soc. BGeorge Gamow using toy pistols, with the ‘reactive’
Bohr apparently winning every duel (Cline 1987). Our
data make it unlikely that these victories can be ascribed
to the benefits associated with reaction. Rather, they
suggest that Bohr was a crack shot, in addition to being
a brilliant physicist.All participants gave written informed consent and local
ethics committees approved the experiments.
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